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The Politics of Civic Combinations

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The Politics of Civic Combinations

The Hungarian case

Participation of civic organizations in diverse social and developmental partnership projects is one of the fastest growing and, at the same time, one of the most contested forms of institutional experimentation.¹ Described by some as a source of democratic innovation, it is characterized by others as a new form of depoliticization and domination. While originating from previous experimentation at sub-national level, the rapid growth of these partnerships is largely due to a search by national governments, international financial institutions or multilateral development agencies for a third way, or a new way, to solve developmental problems after the failure of different market led and state led developmental programs (Howell, J. and Pearce, J. 2002, Evans, P., 1996). With the goal to induce economic growth, development of market institutions or increase social and economic cohesion, these agencies played a major role in reviving the search for ways to capitalize on the collective problem solving capacities of combined local stakeholders (Commission of the European Community, 1997; UNDP, 1993, 1995; World Bank, 1992, 1996, 1998).

¹ For critical overview of the literature on developmental partnerships see Howell, J. and Pearce, J. 2002 and Kaldor, M., Anheier, H., and Glasius, M. 2003

Partly influencing, partly accompanying this search was the ongoing debate on what is, and/or what should be the relationship between market and civil society. In part, this debate was about the effects of various types of civic action on the evolution of diverse properties of markets but it also involved debate on the politics of civic action and raised the normative issue of what is the ‘right’ type of civic action in relationship to markets. Induced by the work of Robert Putnam, a fruitful debate evolved on what form of *civic associative action* makes markets work² or whether and how societies with weak and/or non democratic states could capitalize on civic associative action³. Research on developmental partnerships involving *civic participation* raised the question whether trust generating civic associative action is the precondition of developmental partnerships, or it is collective problem solving action that creates ‘studied trust’⁴. Studies on *civic political activism* raised the question whether and how transnationalizing civic activism could become a countervailing force to globalizing capital and alter the way markets are governed at national, regional and global levels⁵.

On the issue of the inclusion of civic actors in developmental partnerships two diametrically opposing views are represented in the literature with little dialogue between the representatives of the opposing views. For those who write about it supportively, civic combination with diverse state and non-state actors represents an innovative form of institutional experimentation that allows diverse actors in local societies to combine and

² e.g. whether the density of connections created by civic associative action makes markets work or their specific configuration and/or the existence of weak ties. See e.g. Locke, D. 199x , WB volume on social capital, and many more references

³ references to Julia Eschenbacher and more

⁴ Charles Sabel

⁵ references

address problems of market and state failure⁶. It represents an alternative way of governing collective action among actors having stakes in the evolution of markets. The inclusion of civic organizations (COs) in such developmental programs and policy making is seen from this perspective as empowerment giving room for COs to represent interests, considerations and values that otherwise would be excluded and thus civic combination is seen from this perspective as a mechanism of framing markets more inclusive. Finally, the participation of COs involved in local institutional experimentation in policy making at national and supra-national levels is pictured in this approach as a democratic innovation increasing the capacity of decision making bodies to solve problems and make more inclusive policies (O. Gerstenberg and Cohen, 1999, Bruszt and Stark, 2003)

Many others strongly reject these developmental combinations arguing that these are nothing but just the cost-effective ways of alleviating some of the social and economic side effects of neo-liberal policies, the down-scaling of the welfare state, or of the top down developmental programs⁷. The combination of COs with diverse state and market actors turns them into service organization, ‘corporatizes’ and depoliticizes them.

Partnerships with state and business are contrasted in this approach to civic

⁶ There are several roots of this approach. In economic sociology and the literature on forms of economic governance, the works of Sabel, Streeck and Schmitter influenced most the thinking about the role played by developmental associations, associations and elements of ‘directly deliberative poliarchy’ as a form of political and economic governance. Another direction that influenced thinking on different partnerships came from the literature on the non-profit sector, See the work of Anheier et al, and Powell and Clemes, 1998. On deliberative association in post-socialist transformation see Stark and Bruszt, 1998.

⁷ E.g. Kaldor, M., Anheier, H., and Glasius, M. in their introductory chapter to *Global Civil Society* 2003 subsume these combinations under the rubric of *new public management* and talk about the ‘basically neo-liberal role NGOs assume in public management manifestations’. See also Kettle, 2000; Chandhoke, 2002; and Perrow, 2001, 2002; Anderson, K. 2000. For a more balanced critique of NGO participation in partnerships see Howell, J. and Pearce, J. 2002

associationism of a ‘strong and vibrant civil society’ and to civic political activism that is the ‘source of dissent, challenge and innovation, a countervailing force to government and the corporate sector’ (Kaldor, M., Anheier, H., and Glasius, M, 2003). If political participation of involved COs in policy making is mentioned, it is described as a means to ‘provide a semblance of democratic legitimacy’ (Anderson, K., 2000). Instead of empowerment, in this part of the literature participation in partnerships with state and/or business is presented as a mechanism of dis-empowerment, and depoliticization.

In this paper we address the issue of variation among COs that participate in developmental partnerships contrasting service NGOs with COs engaged in civic combination. The difference between the two is that the later combine participation in local problem solving with political action to create and shape room for decentralized institutional experimentation and to feed back the outcomes of local learning into political decision making. Organizations that combine participation in local learning and political activism we call combinatory COs.

Below we will discuss the question of what factors shape the coming about and functioning of combinatory COs. We take issue with the ‘purist’ view of ‘autonomous civil society’ that claims that mixing with state and business is *per se* corrupting⁸. Some of these partnerships might lock participating COs in servicing roles, others might not. Some of the COs involved in policy making might be the creatures of the state or of an IO, others are not. The study of the *factors* of variation might contribute to the better

⁸ For a critique of ‘purist’ views see Jurgen Kocka’s conceptual outline to the CiSoNet project. See also Emirbayer and ..

understanding why in some places we find primarily servicing NGOs and why at other places also COs that combine local collaborative action and political activism. Also, it might contribute to the study of the question whether and under what conditions could civic participation in governing local institutional experimentation contribute to democratic innovation. The study of *variation* among COs entering into local collaboration with actors from other organizational fields might contribute to the better understanding of variation among civic political activists at national and supranational levels. One of the important distinctions made recently in the study of civic political activism was the differentiation between activists and organizations that are deeply rooted in local society and the ones that are not. Here we refer to the concept of ‘rooted cosmopolitans’ of Randeria Shalini, or the distinction made between transnational social movements and transnational advocacy networks by Keck, Sikking and Tarrow (Shalini, 2002, 2003; Keck and Sikking, 199x, Tarrow, 1998). These studies have clearly demonstrated how strategies, values, scope and impact of political action by activists and organizations varies depending of the existence of local roots. Here we argue that activists and COs might not only differ in the **degree** of local roots but also in **kind**.

Moving back and forth between local action in partnership projects and political action at the different levels of policy-making combinatory COs act both as agents of social learning and as agents of political innovation. First, by way of political action combinatory COs shape the way developmental goals are set, priorities are defined and ordered and boundaries of local action are made. To the degree that they succeed, they contribute to preventing local actors from being locked into hierarchically set definitions

of ‘public good’ and pre-set definitions of the ‘only right way’ of producing these goods. They increase the room for experimenting with diverse combinations of actors, resources and goals to solve local problems. They contribute to the coming about of local publics: socio-political networks in which actors can cross the boundaries of different organizational fields (government, business, education, science, mass media etc.), and experiment with various ways of redefining previous relations of independence into relations of interdependence. In these local publics actors can deliberate and make deliberate efforts to produce new definitions for goods that are based on the combination of multiple evaluative principles. The combinations produced in different projects enrich the local pool of available definitions of ‘public goods’. The move from one project to another offers opportunities for cross-fertilization, for mixing or recombining. COs participating in such projects are not merely implementing hierarchically set definitions of ‘public good’ in the ‘only right way’. In the increased room the partnership project becomes a site for decentralized social learning. Political action of combinatory COs, on the other hand transfers the outcomes of local experimentation to national or supra-national levels and provides alternative representations for solving social and/or economic problems based on new combinations to define and produce ‘public goods’.

In our discussion of the factors that shape and constrain the possibility of coming about and functioning of combinatory COs we draw on the literature on decentralized institutional experimentation⁹. One of the issues that is discussed in this literature is the question of how institutional change is governed and how the characteristics of the organization of governance shape the room and the incentives of local actors to combine,

experiment and engage in political action. Here governance refers to the way binding decisions about developmental goals are made, priorities are defined and ordered and boundaries of local action are drawn. Within hierarchical governance of institutional change decision making is fragmented and insulated. Whether it is an international developmental organization or a national government, in a hierarchical regime of governance separate ‘change teams’ define the problems to be addressed, the goods that have to be produced and the right ways to produce them. Decision making in such a system is fragmented: ‘change teams’ working on one type of problem do not communicate with ‘change teams’ working on another. They work insulated from other departments or agencies with the exclusion of the lower levels of the state and diverse social actors. Local actors might have some room and incentive for institutional experimentation in such a regime but in its own jurisdiction the center expects implementation from local actors and makes attempts to experiment or to transfer outcomes of eventual learning a ‘high cost low gain’ activity.

At the other extreme is a regime of governance in which decision-making is embedded in a network of various departments and agencies representing diverse definitions of the problems to be addressed, goods to be produced and ways to produce them. Intelligence is distributed in such a regime: none of the representations of ‘public good’ can claim absolute validity. Distribution of authority within such a regime prevents decision making to be made based on a single representation¹⁰. The built in checks and balances in such a regime continuously force decision-makers to take into account diverse

⁹ references to Sable, Stark, McDermott, Amsell, Dornisch, Grabher etc,

¹⁰ On the concept of distributed authority and distributed intelligence see Stark, 2001, 2002; Bruszt, 2002

representations of ‘public good’, to search for ways to find accommodation among them and try to make previously conflicting representations complementary. In this regime of extended accountability local actors have large room for institutional experimentation, they can represent and contrast the outcomes of local learning with the outcomes of other experiments and they can influence decision making.

This distinction between alternative regimes of governing decentralized institutional experimentation helps to better understand the macro-political factors that shape and constrain the strategies of local COs’. In a hierarchical exclusionary regime COs might have weaker incentives to enter into political action and in their fight for scarce resources they are more likely to get locked into servicing roles. Also, it is likely that the incentives to combine participation in partnerships with political action will be higher in the other regime. But the structure of political opportunities represented by the two regimes does not determine CO action¹¹. In closed, exclusionary regimes combinatory COs might experience with more contentious forms of action and try to influence decision-making by mobilizing and demonstrating support for alternative definitions of public good. Even in a more open regime, some COs might not value political action and others might have weak incentives to act if the gains from other types of activities, like servicing, outweigh the probable costs of political action.

Here we will consider two alternative mechanisms that (besides the most probable explanation that a CO might value political action for its own sake¹²) might induce

¹¹ on opportunity structure and the limitations of explanations of behavior based solely on them see Tarrow, 1998; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2003

¹² See the argument of Albert Hirschmann that investment in political action for activists is not a cost, but a gain in Hirschmann, A., *Essays in Trespassing*

hesitant COs to enter into political action. First, we suggest that extended accountability of COs strongly embedded in local societies might be a good predictor of political action. Such COs have to take into account diverse local interests mediated by members, constituents, clients, other local COs, INGOs working there and the press. To the degree that they are embedded in relations of local extended accountability, similar to the one discussed above at the macro-level, they might have strong incentives, not to say strong push, not to accept status quo and engage in political action. CO's with weak local accountability on the other hand might have weaker incentive to act even within open opportunity structures.

The alternative mechanism might be that in partnership projects involving both state and non-state actors, local collective problem solving might easily shift towards inclusion of local actors in policy-making networks. COs in this case might be pulled into political action.

Based on the above considerations, we expect to find the biggest number of combinatory COs in places where the state (or the developmental agency) is open, some of the state agencies are eager to learn and participate in local problem-solving projects and the COs involved in these projects are embedded in relations of extended accountability.

Hungary, one of the new member countries of EU provides a striking laboratory for exploring the co-evolution of CO strategies and institutional experimentation: the emergence of voluntary associations in Hungary coincides with the starting of one of the largest wave of institutional experimentation. Prior to 1989, there were almost no non-

governmental organizations (NGOs)¹³ in the conventional sense in this country, and the pre-regime change governments, except of the 1968 economic reform, had low toleration for any kind of institutional experimentation. After the regime change NGOs experienced with exponential growth throughout the region. In Hungary the number of NGOs jumped to about 15,000 in the first year after the democratic transition and now stands at over 50,000 (Kuti 2001).

In the first phase after the regime change, institutional experimentation at the national level was largely centralized (Stark and Bruszt, 1998). At the local levels actors had limited financial or political autonomy to try to address mounting problems of social and economic dislocation. David Dornisch's characterization of the first local attempts to address problems of large-scale dislocations in the post-communist Poland is fitting to the Hungarian case too. These were 'highly improvised contingent experiments by a chance set of actors to accomplish tasks never dealt with before' (Dornisch, 1998). Many of these first trials were attempts to capitalize on the pre-existing economic, social and political networks (Keune, 2004). The newly formed NGOs in this first period could not go much beyond the roles of 'safety net', trying to contribute to the alleviation of social problems, and 'safety valve' – signaling unsolved problems.

The evolution of local institutional experimentation after the first phase of economic transformation was largely shaped by the attempts of the central government to share responsibilities in problem solving with local actors under the conditions of hierarchical

¹³ In this paper NGO refers to the legal status of the organization independently of the fact whether it came about from below or it was created by the (local) state. Civic organization (CO) in this paper refers to NGOs that were created from below, report to their members and/or constituents and have as their goal to address social, developmental or political problems either by way of local action, political action or the combination of the two. This definition excludes (local) state created NGOs. It also excludes free time, hobby or sport related NGOs and NGOs that deal solely with the mobilization of funding for a single organization like a school, a hospital or a library.

governance of local institutional experimentation. Some of the programs of the central government gave considerable rights and resources to combinations of local actors to solve problems. Tripartite county labor market councils were created with considerable decision making rights to solve local employment problems. Territorial development councils were created to address encompassing problems of social and economic restructuring in crisis regions. Taking back the rights of local actors soon followed such decentralizations, leaving a limited room for local institutional experimentation. In this limited room, local self-governments, NGOs and business firms tried to associate and combine. The arrival of the first EU pre-accession developmental programs gave some encouragement to local experimentation but they could not and did not change the hierarchical nature of the governance of local institutional experimentation. Some of these early EU programs explicitly encouraged combinations of actors from diverse organizational fields and the creation of association among diverse problem areas. The principle of *partnership* of the EU Phare programs made as a condition of access to EU funds to combine diverse types of actors in projects. The principle of *integration* of the same programs, encouraged experimentation with association of separate searches for solving diverse problems. Attempts at local problem solving and support programs coming from without combined allowing local NGOs to learn new roles and new rules. In the process of preparation for the post-accession regional developmental programs of the EU, regional developmental councils (RDC) and regional developmental agencies (RDA) were created with the explicitly stated goal to act as agents of local institutional experimentation and as prime-movers and facilitators of local problem solving

combinations. Plans were created for regional decentralization and the transformation of the hierarchical regime of governance.

By the late 90's it became clear that the latitudes of the central government will not change and that the EU will encourage further centralization, instead of political decentralization and power sharing among the different levels of government (Keating, M., 2002, Sasse, G. 2002). Giving priority to technical accountability over extended political accountability, the EU supported further centralization and the creation of an institutional framework for developmental planning in which regions and local actors can only play a marginal role (Bruszt, 2002). Local actors, including NGOs were largely excluded from the preparation of a single national development plan. While formally they can participate in the formulation of specific programs, the key role assigned to them in this regime is to participate in projects worked out in the center. It is in this field, where we undertook to study variation among COs participating in local developmental projects.

Our task in this paper is to examine partnership projects of COs. As our title 'Politics of Civic Combinations' suggests, we study how COs combine political action and participation and what political factors shape political engagement by COs in local developmental projects. If the representatives of the above-mentioned pessimistic view were right, we would only find depoliticized service NGOs. Even if we would find some COs engaged in political action, just the scratching of the surface would do and we would discover 'hierarchy in disguise': political action of NGOs created by the local state. But, as we shall see, we do find lots of combinatory COs not created/governed by the local

state that are engaged in political action. Once having identified combinatory COs we will examine the factors that shape political engagement by local COs.

Data

To identify the relationship between participation in local collaborative projects and political action and to identify factors that account for political engagement by COs in partnership projects we draw on data from a survey of Hungarian local civic associations that we conducted in 2003 in three ‘statistical regions’¹⁴. From among the seven ‘statistical regions’, we choose three: Western Hungary, the most developed region in Hungary that received the largest share of the FDI from among the different regions; Northern Plain, the one region most hit by the social and economic dislocations of economic transformation in Hungary, and Southern Plain, a region representing roughly the Hungarian average both in the level of economic development and in the types of problems that it has to face. Using the database of the Hungarian Statistical Office (HSO) on NGOs in these three regions we compiled a list that ranked non-profit organizations by the size of their budgets. Because our project focuses on civic organizations¹⁵, we excluded organizations in the field of sports (e.g., soccer leagues) and leisure time activities (e.g., stamp collectors) as well as foundations whose sole purpose is to support a single organization (e.g., the fund-raising arm of a museum, hospital,

¹⁴ “Statistical regions’ were created in Hungary during the process of preparation for the reception of EU regional development funds. As the name suggests, these ‘regions’ do not have autonomous political representation.

school, or church). From the remaining list, one third of the organizations is a ‘subsidiary’ of the local state: an NGO created by the local government. These organizations were not excluded from the list, their presence in the sample allows us to compare political action by COs and ‘subsidiary’ NGOs. We employed students of the Institute of Social and European Studies (ISES) at Daniel Berzsenyi College in Szombathely, that has a center of regional studies with a strong track record of empirical research on regional development to administer our survey instrument in face-to-face interviews, typically with the elected president, chief executive officer of the organization, or their deputies. From an initial list of approximately 900 of the largest civic associations in these three ‘regions’ we were able to successfully contact 740 organizations distributed roughly equally among the three ‘regions’.

We took as a unit of our analysis the projects of these organizations. We have asked the representative of the organization to tell how many projects they had during the last two years. If they had more than three projects we have asked them to identify the three most important ones and then we have asked our questions on these projects. If they had three or less then we have asked our questions on these projects. If they had none, we have asked our questions on their ongoing activity.

We defined a project combinatory if it had two or more different types of goals and had two or more collaborative partners. For the identification of goals pursued in the projects we have used a list of 22 developmental goals that we took from the Regional

¹⁵ See footnote N.13 for our definition of COs

Development Plans¹⁶. For each project we have asked whether the furthering of any of these goals was among the goals pursued by the project. For the identification of the partners we have used a list of 15 actors and for each project we have asked which of them have participated in the project¹⁷.

Political activity we have defined as an action directed to altering directly or indirectly policies or regulations at the different levels of the state. Among the types of political actions undertaken by a given CO we have differentiated between action that was forming part of a specific project and action that was unrelated to specific projects. As for the later, we have asked how often the organization tries to put issues on the political agenda, tries to change regulation at the level of government or the self-government and tries to alter balance of forces in its own area of activity ('never' 'sometimes' 'often' 'always'). For the identification of project related political action we have asked for each project whether it consisted any of the following activities: organization of a demonstration, petitioning, lobbying the parliament, lobbying the central government, lobbying the county self-government and lobbying the local self-government.

¹⁶ The list consisted of various *social goals* (improving health conditions, improving social conditions, improving education, increasing employment, strengthening higher education) *economic goals* (furthering industrial development, furthering agricultural development, development of tourism, development of firm creation, strengthening economic innovation, furthering capital influx in the region) *environmental goals* (improving the quality of environment, optimal use of environmental resources, environmental education) and *general regional goals* (improve transportation within the region, improve internal cohesion in the region, improve external territorial relations of the region, further cross-territorial communication, improving the administrative, political institutions of the region).

¹⁷ The list of actors used in the questionnaire: donors, central government, county self-government, local self-government, RDC/RDA, political party, other domestic NGO, foreign NGO, international organization, church, media, a business organization, scientific organization and trade union

Embeddedness in local society we defined as relations of formal and informal accountability that ties a CO to diverse actors in the local society. We speak of formal accountability when a local CO has to formally report to various local social actors. We speak of informal accountability when a local CO has to take into account the interests of various local actors when making decisions. Among the local social actors we have included members, clients, other domestic NGOs, media and newspapers, trade unions and general public. Because of their increased local activity in Hungary, we have also added foreign NGOs to this list. We have asked for each of these types of actors how often the CO has to report to them and how often has it to take their interests into account when making decisions ('never', 'sometimes', 'often' 'always').

To be completed

Combinatory projects

In this section we present an overview of the combination of goals and partners in the CO projects. In the table below we count an organization pursuing a specific type of goal if it selected at least one of the goals that belong to that type of goal¹⁸.

Place Table 1. somewhere here

Of all the CO projects 34 percent pursue a single type of goal. The largest number of such 'single issue' projects is social. The number of project pursuing solely economic goals is

the lowest in this category of projects. Most of the CO projects that we could identify are combinatory (66%) and 29 percent of the projects combines all the three types of goals. The third column shows the average number of the participating partners in the specific types of projects. CO projects that combine all the three types of goals have in the average 3,4 partners. We were also interested in the degree of combination of partners from different organizational fields (e.g. state, market, science, church, media, education etc.). The highly combinatory projects that combine all the three types of goals are also highly combinatory in the types of partners: in the average 3,1 different types of partners participate in such projects.

Highly combinatory projects combine diverse types of organizations: they are sites for organizing diversity. These are also the projects that are most likely to involve in a joint collaborative problem solving actors from the state, the market and civil society together.

Place Table 2 somewhere here

In nearly one third of the highly combinatory projects we find actors from these three organizational fields to act as project participants together. If state and market actors combine in a CO project, they are significantly more likely to participate in a highly combinatory project. Only 28,5 percent of these types of projects are done without the participation of either a state or market actor. In one third of these projects a state actor participates without a market actor and in 7,2 percent of the projects a market actor participates, without anyone representing the state.

¹⁸ see footnote 16 for the list of the goals

Combinatory COs

In this section we present a first-order test of the relationship between participation in highly combinatory projects and political action. In the basic cross-tabulations reported below, we count a project highly combinatory if it pursues all three types of goals. Recall that almost 30 percent of the civic associations in our population of the largest organizations was participating in highly combinatory projects.

Place Table 3 somewhere here

Organizations engaged in highly combinatory projects are significantly more likely to engage in political action not directly related to a specific project. Around 60 percent of them tries to put issues on the political agenda, nearly two thirds of them tries to change regulation at the level of government or self-government and somewhat less than two thirds of them tries to alter balance of forces with some frequency. We find a similar pattern if we look at political action that forms part of a specific project.

Place Table 4 somewhere here

Highly combinatory projects are significantly more likely to involve some form of political action than less combinatory projects or projects that do not combine goals and partners.

Subsidiary NGOs and combinatory COs

In this section we present a first-order test of the relationship between closeness of NGOs to local state and political action. We measured closeness with the help of six variables:

1/ whether or not the NGO was created by the local state 2/ whether or not the representative of the local state is member of the governing body of the NGO 3/ whether or not the NGO gets money from the local state 4/ whether or not the NGO has to take into account with some frequency the interests of the local state when making decisions 5/whether or not the NGO has to report with some frequency to the local state and 6/whether or not the local state is a participating partner in the project of the NGO. We defined as *subsidiary NGO* an organization that was created by the local state or that has representative(s) of the local state in its governing body. All the NGOs that were not created by the local state and did not have the representative of the local state on their governing body we counted as CO. Using cluster analysis, we have differentiated among six types of NGOs based on their closeness to the local state.

Place Table 5 somewhere here

Around 30 percent of the NGOs in our survey are subsidiary NGOs. The first type of subsidiary NGOs (16,1%) was created by the local state, the representative of the local state sits on the governing body of the NGO, and the local state gives money to the organization. The second type of the subsidiary NGOs (6,0%) was created by the local state but in these NGOs we don't find the representative of the local state on the board of

the NGO. Finally, the third type of subsidiary NGOs (7,6 %) differs from the previous two primarily by the fact that it does not get money from the local state.

Of all the NGOs in our survey, nearly 70 percent is a CO. The largest number of the COs does not have any relationship with the local state. A smaller group of COs has only one type of relationship with the local state: it gets money from it. Finally, roughly equal number of COs is in a close collaborative relationship with the local state: they get money from the local state, they report with some frequency to it and the local state participates in some of their projects.

Below we present a first-order test of the relationship between closeness to local state and political action.

Place Table 6 somewhere here

Subsidiary NGOs are significantly less likely to enter into political action than COs and most of the political action is undertaken by COs. COs that have no relationship with local state are significantly more likely to lobby the parliament and the government and COs that have a close relationship with the local state are significantly more likely to do petitioning, lobby the parliament and the government. COs that get only money from the local state differ from the previous two types of COs: they are less likely to enter in political action.

Factors of political action

Combinatory COs are significantly more likely to enter in political action and political action is significantly more likely to be undertaken by COs not created/governed by the local state. While many of the COs in combinatory projects do not enter into any kind of political action, we did not find a general tendency of ‘depoliticization’ caused by participation on partnership projects and we could not identify political action with ‘hierarchy in disguise’.

Behind the strong association between participation in highly combinatory projects and political action one could suspect the work of several other factors, besides the assumption that COs in such projects value decentralized experimentation and enter into political action to defend/increase the room for it. In the equations below we use CELMIX7 (highly combinatory projects) to assess the relation between political action and participation in a combinatory project.

An alternative mechanism could be that strong embeddedness in local society pushes COs to engage in political action. Informal and formal accountability to local social actors means that COs have to take into account the interests of diverse local actors when making decisions and/or they have to report to them. To assess the role played by informal and formal accountability we used the following variables in the equations below: 1/the CO has to take into account the interests of members (K96.4), clients (K96.5), other domestic NGOs (K96.12), foreign NGOs (K96.13), the media/newspapers

(K96.16), the general public (K96.18) and the trade unions (K96.20) 2/ the CO has to formally report to members (K97.4), clients (K97.5), other domestic NGOs (K97.12), foreign NGOs (K97.13), the media/newspapers (K97.16), the general public (K97.18) and the trade unions (K97.20).

A third factor might be the size of the CO: larger, more resourceful CSOs and COs that are not dependent on a small number of sources for money might better afford to get into political action. In the equations we used the size of the budget of the CO (LOGK98) and the diversity of the sources of CO revenue (FORRASOK) to control for their effect.

A fourth explanation might be that political action is primarily about money: political action might have not much to do with the desire to defend decentralized experimentation or represent local interest. By engaging in political action COs 'go for money'. COs that have applied successfully for central government or local government moneys might have strong incentive to try again and they are accordingly more likely to enter in political action. To control for the effect of this factor, we used K99.1D – whether the CO applied successfully for central government money and K99.2D – whether the CO applied successfully for local state money.

A fifth mechanism might be that it is too close relationship to the local state that makes organizations to enter in political action. One possibility is that subsidiary NGOs might be pushed in political action by the local state. To control for this effect we have used K115.6D – standing for subsidiary NGOs created by the local state. An alternative

explanation might be that COs that see too much dependence on the local state a problem might enter in political action. We have used K117.9. – positive answer to the question whether too much dependence on the local state is among the problems of the CO.

The next alternative mechanism might be that it is the close collaboration with the central government in local developmental projects that might stand behind COs' political action. If the agencies of the central government directly collaborate with local COs in local problem solving experimentation they might extend local collaboration and pull COs in policy making networks. Political action by COs is accordingly the effect of deep integration with government. To control for this effect we have used the results of a cluster analysis of the different types of interactions between the central state and the local COs (results not shown here). Here we use the cluster of 'deep integration' GOV_CLU6D a pattern of interaction with government that combines all the four types of interactions that we have used in the analysis: getting money from the government, taking into account the interests of the government, reporting to the government and direct participation of the government in the projects of the CO.

Finally, COs in one region might have different opportunities to enter in political action than in the other. D_ALF in the equations below stands for Southern Plain and NY_DU stands for Western Hungary.

In the first equation below we used the undertaking of attempts to change regulation at the level of government or self-government as the dependent variable in a stepwise logistic regression analysis.

Place Table 7 somewhere here

Highly combinatory projects maintain their independent effect: COs in such projects are 1,8 times more likely to try to change regulations of the government or the self-government. Accountability to local social actors matters: COs that have to take into account the interests of their members are 1,5 times more likely to enter in this type of political action and similar is the effect of the requirement of formal reporting to members. Taking into account the interests of foreign NGOs and of the general public has the same effect.

The effect of the size of budget is also significant. COs with large budget are 1,8 times more likely to engage in this type of political action. COs that are deeply integrated in their interactions with the central government are 2 times more likely to enter in political action. Finally, COs in Western Hungary are significantly less likely to get engaged in political action.

Variation in the diversity of the sources of revenue does not make a difference.

Successful application for government or local state money is not a factor in explaining

this type of political action. Finally, closeness to the local state in either its forms does not account for variation in political action.

In the second equation below we used the undertaking of attempts to try to change balance of forces in the area of activity of the given CO as the dependent variable.

Place Table 8 somewhere here

Participation in combinatory project loses its effect in this equation. As above, local social relations of accountability matter significantly: COs that have to take into account the interests of their members are 1,8 times more likely to try to alter balance of forces and similar is the effect of the need to take into account the interests of general public, the interests of trade unions and the requirement to formally report to the general public.

Resources matter significantly: COs with larger budget are 1,2 time more likely to try this type of political action. COs that see too strong dependence from the local state as a problem are 1,8 times more likely to try to change the balance of forces and as above, the COs from Western Hungary are less likely to act.

None of the remaining variables has effect on this type of political action.

Finally, in the third equation below we used lobbying the central government as the dependent variable.

Place Table 9 somewhere here

Participation in highly combinatory projects increases two times the probability of lobbying the government. As in the equations above, relations of local accountability matter: the need to take into account the interests of members, the need to take into account the interests of trade unions and the requirement to report to other domestic NGOs significantly increase the probability of lobbying the government.

Resources also matter: more resourceful COs, or COs that have more diverse portfolio of resources are somewhat more likely to lobby the government.

Getting money from the government and the local state matter but dramatically differently. Successful application for government money increases, successful application for local state money decreases the probability of lobbying the government.

Deep collaboration of COs with the central government nearly doubles the probability of this type of political action.

Discussion and conclusion

To be completed

Table 1.**Goal combinations in projects**

Goals	Frequency	Percent	Average n. of Project Partners
1/ Social	282	18,4	1,7
2/ Economic	70	4,6	1,9
3/ Regional/Environmental	165	10,8	1,9
4/ Social + Economic	58	3,8	2,0
5/ Social + Regional/Environmental	338	22,0	2,4
6/ Economic + Regional/Environmental	175	11,4	2,4
7/ Combining all three types	445	29,0	3,4
Total	1553	100,0	2,5

Table 2.

Participation of state and market actors in the different types of projects

		Type of partners				Total
		Neither state-nor market	Only state	Only market	State and Market	
Goalmix	Social	153	92	11	26	282
		54,3%	32,6%	3,9%	9,2%	100,0%
		25,4%	16,9%	12,8%	8,6%	18,4%
		5,7	-1,1	-1,4	-4,9	
	Economic	29	26	7	8	70
		41,4%	37,1%	10,0%	11,4%	100,0%
		4,8%	4,8%	8,1%	2,7%	4,6%
		,4	,3	1,6	-1,8	
	Regional/Environmental	73	67	6	19	165
		44,2%	40,6%	3,6%	11,5%	100,0%
		12,1%	12,3%	7,0%	6,3%	10,8%
		1,4	1,5	-1,2	-2,8	
Social + Economic	20	19	8	11	58	
	34,5%	32,8%	13,8%	19,0%	100,0%	
	3,3%	3,5%	9,3%	3,7%	3,8%	
	-,8	-,4	2,8	-,1		
Social + Reg/Environm.	135	130	14	59	338	
	39,9%	38,5%	4,1%	17,5%	100,0%	
	22,4%	23,9%	16,3%	19,6%	22,0%	
	,3	1,3	-1,3	-1,1		
Economic+ Reg/Environm.	66	62	8	39	175	
	37,7%	35,4%	4,6%	22,3%	100,0%	
	10,9%	11,4%	9,3%	13,0%	11,4%	
	-,5	,0	-,6	,9		
All three	127	147	32	139	445	
	28,5%	33,0%	7,2%	31,2%	100,0%	
	21,1%	27,1%	37,2%	46,2%	29,0%	
	-5,5	-1,2	1,7	7,3		
Total	603	543	86	301	1533	
	39,3%	35,4%	5,6%	19,6%	100,0%	
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	

The fourth row in the cells shows the Adjusted Residuals

Table 3.

**Political action by highly combinatory organizations
Not directly linked to a specific project**

	Highly Combinatory Organizations %*	All Organizations %**	Adj.R.*
Try to put issues on the political agenda	59,8	49,2	4,4
Try to change regulation at the level of govt. or self- gvt.	74,3	64,1	5,5
Try to alter balance of forces	63,9	58,3	2,7

** Adj.R. = adjusted residual

* The total of the sometimes, often and always answers

Table 4.

**Political action by highly combinatory organizations
Directly linked to a specific project**

	Highly Combinatory Organizations %	All Organizations %	Adj.R.*
Type of political action			
Petitioning	13,7	9,3	2,8
Lobby Parliament	11,9	8,7	2,4
Lobby Government	37,3	26,7	5,0
Lobby Self-gvt.	62,5	49,3	5,4
Lobby County S.gvt	31,6	21,5	5,1

* Adj.R. = adjusted residual

Table 5.

Frequency of the different patterns of relationships with self-governments

Pattern of relationship	N.	%
1 Subsidiary Type 1.	118	16.1
2 Subsidiary Type 2.	44	6.0
3 Subsidiary Type 3.	56	7.6
4 Money, Participation, Report	121	16.5
5 Money	119	16.1
6 No relationship	276	37.7
Total	734	

Table 6.

Patterns of relationship with self-government and political action

Pattern of relationship	Type of political action					
	Petitioning		Lobbying Parliament		Lobbying Government	
	%	A.R.	%	A.R.	%	A.R.*
1 Subsidiary Type 1.	4,4	-3,4	5,4	-2,5	22,0	-2,1
2 Subsidiary Type 2.	13,8	1,4	3,2	-2,0	17,2	-2,1
3 Subsidiary Type 3.	5,3	-1,6	8,8	-0,2	21,9	-1,2
4 Money, Participation, Report	12,9	2,3	12,7	2,5	34,3	3,5
5. Money	10,4	0,5	6,9	-1,3	20,8	-2,3
6. No relationship	10,4	0,7	11,3	2,1	30,3	2,3
All (%)	9,6		9,1		26,7	

* Number of projects

Table 7.
Logistic Regression

Dependent variable: Try to change regulation at the level of government or self-government

		Variables in the Equation					
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 ^a	CELMIX7	.599	.152	15.557	1	.000	1.820
	K96.4_D	.407	.206	3.919	1	.048	1.502
	K96.5_D	-.091	.182	.251	1	.616	.913
	K96.12_D	.161	.183	.773	1	.379	1.175
	K96.13_D	.453	.205	4.872	1	.027	1.574
	K96.16_D	.189	.183	1.068	1	.301	1.208
	K96.18_D	.350	.199	3.079	1	.079	1.419
	K96.20_D	.383	.316	1.472	1	.225	1.467
	K97.4_D	.397	.168	5.619	1	.018	1.488
	K97.5_D	.232	.203	1.298	1	.254	1.261
	K97.12_D	.013	.191	.005	1	.946	1.013
	K97.13_D	.038	.267	.020	1	.888	1.038
	K97.16_D	-.154	.215	.509	1	.476	.858
	K97.18_D	.267	.200	1.790	1	.181	1.306
	K97.20_D	-.369	.402	.845	1	.358	.691
	LOGK98	.590	.102	33.125	1	.000	1.804
	FORRASOK	-.040	.039	1.018	1	.313	.961
	K99.1_D	.108	.157	.478	1	.489	1.114
	K99.2_D	.056	.166	.114	1	.736	1.058
	K115.6_D	.175	.171	1.047	1	.306	1.191
	K117.9_D	.043	.176	.059	1	.807	1.044
	GOV_CL6D	.781	.218	12.828	1	.000	2.184
	D_ALF	-.167	.163	1.047	1	.306	.846
	NY_DU	-.482	.162	8.898	1	.003	.618
	Constant	-3.006	.466	41.638	1	.000	.049

^a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: D_ALF, NY_DU.

Nagelkerke R Square .253

Table 8.**Logistic Regression****Dependent variable: Try to alter balance of forces**

		Variables in the Equation					
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 ^a	CELMIX7	.216	.144	2.246	1	.134	1.242
	K96.4_D	.597	.198	9.066	1	.003	1.817
	K96.5_D	.025	.177	.020	1	.889	1.025
	K96.12_D	.203	.181	1.258	1	.262	1.225
	K96.13_D	.203	.199	1.044	1	.307	1.225
	K96.16_D	-.328	.181	3.294	1	.070	.720
	K96.18_D	.539	.195	7.626	1	.006	1.715
	K96.20_D	.669	.294	5.181	1	.023	1.952
	K97.4_D	.088	.162	.293	1	.588	1.092
	K97.5_D	.093	.190	.241	1	.624	1.098
	K97.12_D	-.087	.183	.226	1	.635	.917
	K97.13_D	.179	.252	.504	1	.478	1.196
	K97.16_D	-.099	.207	.228	1	.633	.906
	K97.18_D	.553	.192	8.289	1	.004	1.739
	K97.20_D	.548	.428	1.639	1	.200	1.730
	LOGK98	.194	.098	3.878	1	.049	1.214
	FORRASOK	-.009	.038	.056	1	.812	.991
	K99.1_D	.249	.155	2.578	1	.108	1.283
	K99.2_D	.200	.161	1.544	1	.214	1.221
	K115.6_D	-.229	.166	1.897	1	.168	.796
	K117.9_D	.632	.179	12.536	1	.000	1.882
	GOV_CL6D	.126	.198	.405	1	.525	1.134
	D_ALF	.143	.159	.805	1	.369	1.154
	NY_DU	-.327	.155	4.430	1	.035	.721
	Constant	-1.850	.446	17.207	1	.000	.157

^a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: D_ALF, NY_DU.

Nagelkerke R Square .212

Table 9.**Logistic Regression****Dependent variable: Lobby Government**

		Variables in the Equation					
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 ^a	CELMIX7	.718	.143	25.274	1	.000	2.050
	K96.4_D	.451	.231	3.829	1	.050	1.570
	K96.5_D	-.211	.200	1.107	1	.293	.810
	K96.12_D	-.031	.195	.025	1	.874	.970
	K96.13_D	-.105	.199	.281	1	.596	.900
	K96.16_D	-.174	.186	.874	1	.350	.840
	K96.18_D	.173	.213	.658	1	.417	1.188
	K96.20_D	.592	.260	5.205	1	.023	1.808
	K97.4_D	.063	.178	.125	1	.724	1.065
	K97.5_D	-.012	.196	.004	1	.953	.988
	K97.12_D	.374	.188	3.950	1	.047	1.453
	K97.13_D	.201	.234	.740	1	.390	1.223
	K97.16_D	-.048	.200	.059	1	.808	.953
	K97.18_D	-.012	.201	.004	1	.951	.988
	K97.20_D	.090	.341	.070	1	.791	1.095
	LOGK98	.245	.105	5.468	1	.019	1.277
	FORRASOK	.089	.040	4.974	1	.026	1.093
	K99.1_D	.574	.170	11.457	1	.001	1.775
	K99.2_D	-.530	.174	9.311	1	.002	.589
	K115.6_D	-.251	.177	2.012	1	.156	.778
	K117.9_D	-.346	.186	3.436	1	.064	.708
	GOV_CL6D	.679	.185	13.528	1	.000	1.973
	D_ALF	-.098	.162	.368	1	.544	.907
	NY_DU	-.468	.167	7.869	1	.005	.626
	Constant	-2.954	.488	36.626	1	.000	.052

^a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: D_ALF, NY_DU.

Nagelkerke R Square .164